Our
Responsibility to Dead Lives
Haim and Rivca
Gordon
ABSTRACT: Historical research was one of
Jean-Paul Sartre's major concerns. Sartre's biographical studies and thought
indicate that history is not only a field in which you gather facts, events,
and processes, but it is a worthy challenge which includes a grave personal
responsibility: my responsibility to the dead lives that preceded me. Sartre's
writings suggest that accepting this responsibility can be a source of wisdom.
Few historians, however, view history as transcending the orderly presenting
and elucidating of facts, events, and processes. I contend that Sartre's
writings suggest a personally enhancing commitment. A lucid and honest response
to the challenges and demands of history and the dead lives that preceded my
own existence is an engagement that requires courage, wisdom, and thought. The consequences of this commitment for teaching history is
discussed.
Historical research was one of Jean-Paul Sartre's major
concerns. Roquentin, the central character of his
first novel, Nausea, has chosen the "profession of historian." (1) He
comes to Bouville in order to write a history of
Monsieur de Rollebon, who was active at the end of
the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Important documents
pertaining to Rollebon's life are in the Bouville library. As the novel develops Roquentin
decides—for good reasons—to abandon his historical research, a decision to
which we return.
Unlike Roquentin, Sartre never
abandoned the realm of historical research. Quite often he discussed history in
his philosophical writings. His plays repeatedly deal with the need to relate
authentically, truthfully to history. In addition, Sartre wrote three
biographies—of Charles Baudelaire, Jean Genet, and The Family Idiot, a close to
three thousand page study of the life of Gustave
Flaubert—in which he suggested and presented an approach to studying the life
of a specific person within his or her situation. Sartre also wrote abbreviated
studies of contemporary history, such as his short book on Castro's
Very few, if any, of Sartre's
insights have been transferred to the realm of historical scholarship or of
teaching history.
Our survey of relevant literature revealed virtually no attempts to learn from
Sartre in these fields. Someone may argue that the compartmentalization of
scholarship—whereby many, if not most, historians rarely read books by
philosophers—may be an important reason for the ignoring of Sartre's insights
in the fields of history and teaching history. Yet, we suspect the influence of
additional reasons. Sartre's thoughts on history and his writings about the past
are very often provoking. They frequently challenge deep rooted assumptions,
prevailing superficial ways of thinking, and accepted norms. We suspect that
they may aggravate no few researchers. Indeed, Sartre's insights often demand a
rethinking of my relationship to specific events in the past, and a
reassessment of my attitude to the field of history, be it defined as a story,
a science, or a collective memory.
To be specific, Sartre's biographical studies and thoughts
indicate that history is not only a field in which you gather facts, events,
and processes so as to reach truths and bring to light knowledge of the past.
Studying, reading, and teaching history is a worthy challenge which also
includes a grave personal responsibility: My responsibility to the dead lives
that preceded me. Lucidly accepting this responsibility, Sartre's writings
indicate, can be a source of wisdom. Few historians, however, view history as
transcending the orderly presenting and elucidating of facts, events, and
processes. What is more, many positivists scorn the idea that any personal
responsibilities or any wisdom may be linked to the historian's orderly
elucidating of past developments, and objective presentation of past events and
processes. They evade, deride, or disparage Sartre's insight that your
existence may be enhanced through responding courageously to the challenges of
history.
We have found Sartre's writings to suggest a personally
enhancing commitment: A lucid and honest response to the challenges and demands
of history and of the dead lives that preceded my existence is an engagement
that requires courage, wisdom, and much thinking. Such a worthy response often
leads to new acts of courage or to wise thoughts, thus slowly meliorating your
mode of existence. In contrast, a mere gathering, presenting, and linking of
facts, events, and processes—which ignores the contradictions that may emerge
in history, and the dialectics of its processes—will rarely lead to such a
process of personal enhancement. Unfortunately, from our extensive research on
Sartre and evil, we learned that few people choose to follow Sartre's wisdom
and his demands to be courageous and thoughtful—in relating to history as in
other fields that he addressed. (3)
In this essay we modestly hope to contribute to a marginal
altering of this sad, and yes, sordid state of affairs by discussing Sartre's
views on one area related to research in and teaching of history: our
responsibility to dead lives.
Herodotus opens The Histories with the statement that his
researches "are here set down to preserve the memory of the past by
putting on record the astonishing achievements both of our own and of other
peoples." (4) Livy writes in the first paragraph of The Early History of
Rome that he will find satisfaction in contributing "to the labour of
putting on record the story of the greatest nation in the world." (5) Both
historians conveyed a tenet central to Sartre's ontology: Those who are living
are responsible that the deeds and words of the dead —indeed, their
freedom—will not pass into oblivion. Sartre indicates that this responsibility
is ontic; it is linked to the distinctiveness of a
dead life.
The unique characteristic of a dead life is that it is a
life of which the Other makes himself the guardian.
This does not mean simply that the Other preserves the
life of the "deceased" by effecting an explicit, cognitive
reconstruction of it. Quite the contrary, such a reconstruction is only one of
the possible attitudes of the other in relation to the dead life; ... a
"reconstructed life" ... is a particular destiny which is going to
mark some lives to the exclusion of others ... To be forgotten is, in fact, to
be resolutely apprehended forever as one element dissolved into a mass (the
"great feudal lords of the thirteenth century," the "bourgeois
Whigs" of the eighteenth, the "Soviet officials," etc.); it is
in no way to be annihilated, but it is to lose one's personal existence in
order to be constituted with others in a collective existence. (6)
According to Sartre's ontology, as a living person you must
establish your relation to the dead lives. This relation may vary. One person
may glorify certain dead lives, another may relate to all dead lives with
indifference. Whatever your choice, one thing is evident: this glorifying or
this indifference will always be a component and reflect your daily decisions
and the life project that you have chosen. In short, there is no escape from
establishing a relationship to the dead. They will always be there, confronting
you directly or far off on the horizon of your being. "In its upsurge into
being, the for-itself must assume a position in
relation to the dead; his initial project organizes them into large anonymous
masses or as distinct individualities." (7)
In the past few decades, feminists have justly argued that
for centuries historians researched and taught a
purposely skewed version of the past which emphasized the prevailing rule of
patriarchy. In this skewed version the lives of dead women were organized in
"large anonymous masses" to which you could easily relate with
indifference; furthermore, many worthy women's "distinct
individualities" were purposely disregarded. Consequently, throngs of
remarkable women lost their "personal existence in order to be constituted
with others in a collective existence." The very many enlightening
historical studies describing outstanding women that have been published in the
past few decades testifies to the distortion of historical research and
teaching that prevailed until the rise of feminism. Such scholarship is a wise
manner, adopted by those who are now alive, to assume the guardianship of many
dead lives of worthy women and record it for coming generations. It is also a
countering of the sexist view of society and history that reigned for
millennia, and a changing of some of the basic concepts that dominated
historical research.
Someone may ask: How does Sartre's emphasis on
responsibility for dead lives deal with the apothegm, acknowledged by many
thinkers and historians, that each generation creates its own history or,
better, its own interpretation of history? What is more, some scholars have
noted that history is always written by the victors. If such is true, what are
my responsibilities to dead lives of the recent and remote past? And even if I
accept Sartre's ontic description of my
responsibility for the dead, what, if any, are its implications for historical
research and for teaching history?
In his plays Altona and Dirty
Hands, and in other writings, Sartre has challenged the maxim that each
generation creates its own interpretation of history. (8) He also firmly
rejected the apothegm that history is written by the victors. He held that
historical research discloses truths so as to obtain knowledge; it is not a
realm of relative judgements. We want to be clear. Sartre knows that rulers and
influential individuals of each generation, like the father in Altona, will attempt to find justifications in the past for
their current policies and choices. They will therefore frequently rewrite
history or choose an appropriate or even false interpretation of history so as
to serve their immediate interests. History based on the oppressive values of
patriarchy, as it was written for millennia, is just one of many examples. Yet,
Sartre points out repeatedly in Being and Nothingness, such acts of bad faith
are also performed by individual consciousnesses. For instance, months or years
after, say,
Sartre also knows that very often the victors write a
distorted history so as to support their actions that led to the victory. A
major example is the brutal conquest of North and
Sartre would agree that such a distorted writing occurs even
in relation to defeats. It is much easier to write a false history of a defeat
if the country that suffered the defeat is still powerful enough to encourage
and support such distortions. Among the many example of such sordid distortions
are the writings of
Indeed, Altona and Dirty Hands and
many of Sartre's other writings resolutely indicate that an authentic
responsibility toward the dead must include a responsibility for the truth
about these dead lives—even if that truth is cruel, harsh, embarrassing, or
painful. If you act as if each generation creates its own interpretation of
history, or as if history is a story written by the victors, your regard for
the truth about the lives of the dead vanishes, as does your concern for truth
as guiding your daily life. Furthermore, Altona and
Dirty Hands show that by such disregard you give way to banal and evil
approaches. Respect for facts disappears. Cynicism very often thrives. Genuine
knowledge is banished to the sidelines. Frequently, bewitching myths and
loathsome fantasies based on partial truths prevail unchallenged. In short, if
you deliberately distort history, an accepted pseudo-knowledge and ruinous
attitudes taint all your relationships: to yourself, to other persons, and to
the world.
Note that responsibility toward dead lives is part of
Sartre's overall understanding of our responsibility in the world. Central to
this responsibility is respect for the freedom of others and the willingness to
struggle that this freedom will not be abused or destroyed. Altona
and Dirty Hands clearly indicate that a person's death in no way relieves me of
my responsibility to respect that person's freedom which existed on earth until
his or her death, and to struggle that the memory of this freedom will not be
distorted or destroyed. In Altona, Franz cannot flee
from his deliberately destroying the freedom of the Russian peasant prisoners
whom he tortured and slowly killed in
Thus, our responsibility for the truth about dead lives and
for the world must be central to historical research and teaching history. The
truth about the oppression of women for millennia must not be camouflaged or
explained away. The truth about the despicable horrors of the European conquest
of the
You still haven't convinced me, someone may say. Isn't it
true that the moment you adopt a feminist approach in relating to the dead
lives of women of the past, your entire concept of historical research must
change? Truths and knowledge pertaining to the role of women in history must be
added, analysed, and integrated into your historical presentation. Won't these
truths and knowledge alter your interpretation of history? And won't these
changed interpretations be unique to the generation that rebels against the
patriarchal principles that for a long period have been accepted in historical
research?
Of course, the discovery of new data, the correcting of
previous mistakes, and the acceptance of better
principles and methods of historical research will lead to new interpretations
of a historical period, or of a dead life. These changes are part of the
historian's authentic pursuit of truth and knowledge. It also may happen that
improved principles of historical research are adopted because of a change for
the better in values and norms in academia and society at large. These
principles can lead to an unearthing of previously ignored data, which can
bring about, dialectically, a better appreciation of and deeper adherence to
the principles. As already noted, one such change and dialectical development
in reading and writing history was brought about by the adoption of the tenets
of feminism. Another new interpretation revealed the horrors and evils of the
five hundred year European conquest of North and
Sartre clearly indicated that there is a stark difference
between adopting a new interpretation of history as part of an ongoing pursuit
of knowledge and truth, or as a result of my struggling for a more just way of
life, and, in contrast, adopting a new interpretation because it is politically
useful, or personally gratifying, or assists in my attempts to justify previous
or current decisions. He believed that his biography of Gustave
Flaubert enriches our knowledge of the life of the author and his period,
because he related to the data with new principles and methods of research that
he formulated and embraced: the initial project, the progressive-regressive
method, etc. (11) He firmly held that his new interpretation of Flaubert's
freedom and existence adds to our knowledge of Gustave's
personality, his family, his milieu, and his period.
As an example note that Sartre's endeavors
for almost two decades to learn about the life of Flaubert through strenuous
historical research, helped by the adoption of new methods, are sharply
distinguished from, say, the almost yearly reinterpretations of history that
were published by the communist party in the former
Thus, Sartre's writings suggest, a new interpretation of a
dead life, or of many dead lives, should never betray factual truths. Such a
betrayal is evil, it is a destruction of the freedom
of past dead lives. In contrast, a new interpretation of an historical person,
event, or period is important and justified when it helps us perceive the
pertaining truths more lucidly and adds to our knowledge. It is also valuable
when, by broadening and deepening our historical knowledge, it helps us to support
and sustain a struggle for a more just world.
It should not surprise that Sartre believes that his
ontology of responsibility, which includes responsibility for dead lives, can
serve as the basis of an ethics. Toward the end of Being and Nothingness he
presents pertinent reflections:
The essential consequence of our earlier remarks is that man
being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his
shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being.
We are taking the word "responsibility" in its ordinary sense as
"consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an
object." In this sense the responsibility of the for-itself is
overwhelming since he is the one by whom it happens that there is a world; ...
(13)
Sartre's reflections suggest a bond of responsibility linked
to the teaching of history. Not only the persons, or nations, or other groups
of people studied by the historian should be grasped as responsible for their
world and way of being. The teacher of history must stress that my decision how
to relate to the dead lives that preceded mine or died during my existence is a
component of my being "responsible for the world" and for myself
"as a way of being." It is also a decision about how human beings
should, today and in the future, live together in the world. When the
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, decided to not condemn his decade of adherence
to Nazism he fled from acting responsibly. When he decided to never mention in
his writings published after 1945 the devastating horrors of the Nazi Holocaust
and the millions of dead lives that resulted from the despicable evils of the
Nazi regime, Heidegger was blatantly evading his responsibility for the world.
By these pernicious and cowardly decisions, when relating to his own and to his
nation's history, he chose a future in which such horrors can continue to be
performed. Heidegger was probably wise enough to know that whoever purposely
ignores a blatant terrible evil, sanctions it and thus
joins the evildoers. Thus, in relation to the Nazi Holocaust, Heidegger joined
the many German evildoers by ignoring his own past evil and the evil of his
compatriots. (14)
Because I am responsible for my existence, for the world,
and for the future, Sartre's ontology reveals, there is no detached learning or
teaching of history. I must take a stance in relation to the dead lives, the
events, and the truths that historical research presents. The key word here is
truths, and many of them are as simple as the horrors performed by the Nazis. A
stance in relation to history, such as that adopted by Martin Heidegger, which
deliberately ignores truths about the horrors inflicted upon human beings and
upon other nations by my nation is evil and ruinous. Unfortunately, as Noam
Chomsky has repeatedly shown, such an evil stance is rather common among many
For instance, many
Indeed, never have mainstream
We can now return to Roquentin.
His abandoning of historical research includes an apt warning. Your
responsibility for dead lives must never lead you to abandon your responsibility
for your own existence, for the living people with whom you share the world,
and for the history of the world that is occurring here and now, while you
exist. Relentlessly devoting your energies to historically resurrecting a dead
life, such as Roquentin did with Monsieur de Rollebon, while hardly learning from this process how to
exist and act responsibly in the world is ruinous. One day in the library of Bouville Roquentin understood.
Monsieur de Rollebon was my
partner: he needed me in order to be and I needed him in order not to feel my
being. I furnished the raw material, that material of which I had far too much,
which I didn't know what to do with: existence, my existence. His task was to
perform. He stood in front of me and had taken possession of my life in order
to perform his life for me. I no longer noticed that I existed... (17)
Roquentin grasped his grave mistake. His
relentless devotion to presenting the details of the dead life of Monsieur de Rollebon brought about his own directionless, and often
desensitized, existence. Yet, do not the fifteen years of hard work which
resulted in The Family Idiot, the almost three thousand page biography that
Sartre published on the life of Gustave Flaubert, reflect an abandoning of the living in favor of one dead life? Not really. Sartre continued to be
deeply involved in the political realm while working on this biography, an
involvement which included, among many other engagements, his struggles against
the unjust murderous war that the
The Family Idiot is the sequel to Search for a Method. Its
subject: what, at this point in time, can we know about a man? It seemed to me
that this question could only be answered by studying a specific case. What do
we know, for example about Gustave Flaubert? Such
knowledge would amount to summing up all the data on him at our disposal. We
have no assurance at the outset that such a summation is possible and that the
truth of a person is not multiple... For a man is never an individual; it would
be more fitting to call him a universal singular. Summed up and for this reason
universalized by his epoch, he in turn resumes it by reproducing himself in it
as singularity. Universal by the singular universality of human history,
singular by the universalizing singularity of his projects, he requires
simultaneous examination from both ends. (18)
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine whether
Sartre succeeded in answering the question he posed as guiding his research
--what, at this point of time, can we know about a man?— although our personal
assessment is very positive. We can, however, state categorically that Sartre's
historical-philosophical research on Gustave Flaubert
is a presentation of a dead life while assuming responsibility for the living
because, to borrow a phrase from Heidegger, it opens a clearing in which truth
is able to emerge. As we have shown elsewhere, some of the truths disclosed in
his study of Flaubert's life have helped us, as readers, learn how to cope with
evil that we have encountered, in the
In summary, teaching history that learns from Sartre is not
only an assuming of responsibility for presenting the whole truth about dead
lives. It is a showing how the worthy deeds and sayings of persons of the past
can guide us to strive to live a fulfilling existence; it will also indicate
that the evil deeds, banal mistakes, and bizarre failings of other dead
persons, such as Gustave Flaubert, point to pitfalls
that we should avoid. Furthermore, the teacher of history should stress that
since the dead lives which you may study determine many components of the
situation in which you find yourself, ignoring them is well nigh impossible. Or
as Sartre put it in a quite similar context: "If the past does not
determine our actions, at least it is such that we can not take a new decision
except in terms of it." (20)
Sartre's approach has additional merits. My
knowledge of and responsibility for dead lives can often contribute lucidity, a
moral outlook, and wisdom to my decisions in the new situation in which I find
myself. It will frequently suggest that I assume responsibility for
people who are living here and now. Consider briefly those Non Government
Organizations, such as Fellowship Of Reconciliation, Maryknoll, or Human Rights Watch, which are situated in the
Finally, we firmly believe that teaching history that learns
from Sartre on my responsibility for dead lives can be an exciting, fulfilling,
and enlightening challenge. While presenting truths of the past it can illuminate
my present situation and indicate a path to pursuing wisdom and a worthy life.
In addition, Sartre's approach to history expresses a much needed call to all
of us to assume responsibility for the many live persons-- our
contemporaries—who are currently being crushed by evil and oppressive forces in
the world.